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Abstract
A resolution of the quantum measurement problem(s) using the consistent histories interpretation
yields in a rather natural way a restriction on what an observer can know about a quantum system,
one that is also consistent with some results in quantum information theory. This analysis provides
a quantum mechanical understanding of some recent work that shows that certain kinds of quantum
behavior are exhibited by a fully classical model if by hypothesis an observer’s knowledge of its state is
appropriately limited.
1 Introduction
The problem of understanding the quantum world continues to give rise to numerous debates. While the
tools of textbook quantum theory allow us to calculate probabilities of measurement outcomes in agreement
with experiment, the problem of understanding these in terms of microscopic quantum phenomena continues
to perplex beginning students as well as their teachers. There are (at least) two distinct strategies for
exploring these questions. One starts with classical physics, which is reasonably well understood, both its
mathematical structure and its physical or intuitive interpretation, and tries to see how far classical ideas
can be pushed into the quantum domain before they fail. This helps locate the classical-quantum boundary,
and identify which classical concepts remain useful once it has been crossed, and which must be abandoned
or radically modified. A second strategy starts from a consistent formulation of microscopic quantum theory,
and seeks to apply it to larger systems to see how classical physics emerges as a suitable, and sometimes
extremely good, approximation to quantum theory at the macroscopic level.
Much current research on hidden variable models represents the first strategy. In a version pioneered
by John Bell, one starts with hypotheses which seem plausible in classical physics and uses them to deduce
consequences, typically inequalities, whose violation by quantum theory and experiment shows that one or
more of the assumptions made in the derivation do not apply to the real quantum world. While some of the
resulting claims, such as that the quantum world is nonlocal or contextual, do not stand up under scrutiny
[1, 2, 3], this research should nonetheless help us better understand quantum mysteries provided the classical
ideas and assumptions underlying the hidden variables approach are clearly and properly identified.
Classical ideas are made quite explicit in Spekkens “toy theory” approach [4], where by hypothesis an
observer can have only a limited knowledge of the actual (ontic) state represented by some collection of
classical variables. This idea has recently been extended in a very careful study [5] of coupled classical
harmonic oscillators, by assuming that an observer’s knowledge, in the form of a probability distribution, is
limited by an epistemic restriction that resembles a quantum uncertainty principle. This restriction allows
the authors to reproduce in an explicitly classical model a number of “weird” effects previously thought to
lie wholly in the domain of quantum physics. To be sure, this approach does not reproduce the entire gamut
of quantum phenomena, but the results encourage the authors to believe, as stated in their introduction,
that there might be an axiomatization of quantum theory in which the first axiom states a fundamental
restriction on how much observers can know about a system, and the second embodies some novel principle
about quantum reality (rather than knowledge thereof). They then add, “Ultimately, the first axiom ought
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to be derivable from the second because what one physical system can know about another ought to be a
consequence of the nature of the dynamical laws.”
We shall show that this is not a vain hope. The “novel principle” has already appeared in the physics
literature as part of an approach embodying the second strategy mentioned above, the effort to understand
how classical physics is an approximation to a more exact underlying quantum theory when the latter is
properly understood and interpreted. What is known as the “consistent” or “decoherent” histories—hereafter
referred to simply as “histories”—program, introduced in [6, 7, 8], provides, on the one hand, a fully consistent
and paradox free (so far as is known at present) approach to microscopic quantum phenomena, and on the
other a means for showing that the laws of classical mechanics are in appropriate circumstances a good
approximation to the underlying and more exact quantum physics. In particular the single framework rule
of Hilbert space quantum mechanics is a novel principle (relative to classical physics) that leads in a rather
natural way to an epistemic restriction of a quite fundamental sort: what an observer can know is limited
by the nature of quantum reality, since that which does not exist also cannot be known.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Since no literature pertaining to the histories
approach is as much as mentioned in [4, 5], Sec. 2 contains a brief summary of the relevant principles, including
the single framework rule. For additional details we refer the reader to other summaries as well as more
extensive treatments of the basic ideas; the following are listed in order of increasing length: [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
In Sec. 3 we show how these principles resolve the measurement problem(s) of quantum foundations, leading
in a rather natural way to restrictions on what can be learned using measurements. Section 4 argues that
the results of Sec. 3 are consistent with quantum information theory. The results are summarized in the
concluding Sec. 5.
2 Hilbert Space Quantum Mechanics
2.1 Quantum properties
A key idea that goes back to von Neumann, Ch. III of [14], is that a physical property—something which
can be true or false, such as “the energy is between 2 and 3 J”—is represented in quantum mechanics by
a (closed) subspace of the quantum Hilbert space or, equivalently, by the projector (orthogonal projection
operator) onto this subspace. (Here and later we assume a finite-dimensional Hilbert space; infinite dimen-
sions complicates the mathematics without resolving any of the quantum conceptual difficulties.) A physical
variable or observable, such as energy or angular momentum, is represented by a Hermitian operator which
can be written in the form
A =
∑
ajPj , Pj = P
†
j = P
2
j ,
∑
j
Pj = I. (1)
Here the {Pj} are a collection of projectors that form a (projective) decomposition of the identity operator
I, and the {aj}, each of which occurs but once in the sum, so j 6= k means aj 6= ak, are the eigenvalues of
A. The property that the physical variable A takes on or possesses the value aj , thus A = aj , corresponds
to the projector Pj or, equivalently, the subspace Pj onto which Pj projects.
In classical mechanics a property corresponds to a set of points P in a classical phase space Γ, as in
Fig. 1(a), and the classical counterpart of a projector is an indicator function P (γ) on the phase space,
which takes the value 1 if γ lies inside P , and 0 if γ lies in the complement Pc of P , the points in Γ that
are not in P . Obviously the two descriptions, using the set P or the indicator P , are equivalent, and set
theoretic operations on sets correspond to arithmetic operations on indicators. Thus the indicator of the
intersection P ∩ Q, the property “P AND Q” or P ∧ Q, is the product PQ, and the indicator for Pc, the
property “NOT P” or ¬P , is given by I − P , where I is the function on Γ everywhere equal to 1.
In quantum mechanics, again following von Neumann, the negation ¬P of a property P is given not
by the set theoretic complement Pc of the subspace P , but instead by its orthogonal complement P⊥, the
collection of all kets (vectors) which are orthogonal to those in P . Indeed, Pc is not a subspace, whereas
P⊥ is a subspace with projector I − P . The situation is shown schematically for a two-dimensional Hilbert
space in Fig. 1(b), where the subspace or ray consisting of all multiples of some nonzero |ψ〉 is labeled P
and its orthogonal complement is the ray P⊥. In the classical case any point that is outside P is inside Pc,
corresponding to the two possibilities that this property is either true or false. By contrast, in the quantum
case there are rays, such as Q in Fig. 1(b), which are different from both P and P⊥. Thus once one accepts
von Neumann’s prescription for quantum properties and their negations, a prescription which lies behind
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Figure 1: (a). Phase space Γ. Properties are indicated by collections of points such as P and Q. (b) Hilbert
space with properties represented by rays such as P , P⊥, and Q.
but is seldom clearly explained in textbook discussions, it is clear that the move from classical to quantum
mechanics must include some changes in ideas about logical reasoning and truth.
This becomes even clearer when considering the conjunction, “P AND Q” or P ∧ Q, of two distinct
physical properties. In the classical case this corresponds to the intersection P ∩ Q of the two sets, or the
product PQ of their indicators. For the quantum case Birkhoff and von Neumann [15] proposed using the
intersection of two subspaces, which is itself a subspace, to represent the conjunction of quantum properties,
with the disjunction, “P or Q or both”, P ∨ Q, defined as the span of the set-theoretic union of P and Q,
consistent with the usual rule that ¬(P ∨Q) = (¬P )∧ (¬Q). While this seems plausible, the resulting logical
structure promptly leads to paradoxes—see Sec. 4.6 of [13] for a simple example—if one employs the usual
rules for reasoning about properties. Birkhoff and von Neumann were aware of this, and their remedy was
to abandon the distributive law P ∧ (Q ∨ R) = (P ∨ Q) ∧ (P ∨ R) as a rule of reasoning in the scheme of
quantum logic they proposed. Despite a great deal of effort, quantum logic has not turned out to be a useful
tool for understanding quantum mechanics and resolving its conceptual difficulties [16, 17].1
The problematic nature of quantum conjunctions is also evident when one uses projectors. The product
PQ of two projectors, corresponding to P ∧ Q, is itself a projector if and only if PQ = QP , in which case
it projects onto the intersection P ∩ Q of the corresponding subspaces. But if the two projectors do not
commute, neither PQ nor QP is a projector, and there is no simple relationship between either of them and
the projector onto P ∩Q. In the histories approach, unlike quantum logic, this is dealt with by introducing a
syntactical rule, an instance of the single framework rule, that says that the conjunction P ∧Q is only defined
if the projectors commute; otherwise, when PQ 6= QP , the conjunction of these properties is undefined or
meaningless (in the sense that this interpretation of quantum mechanics assigns it no meaning). Note the
distinction between a false statement and a meaningless statement, such as P ∧ ∨Q in ordinary logic. The
negation of a false but meaningful statement is a true statement, whereas the negation of a meaningless
statement is equally meaningless.
To better understand what is and is not implied by the single framework rule and its relation to textbook
quantum mechanics, consider the Hilbert space of a spin-half particle, with the orthonormal basis {|z+〉, |z−〉}
corresponding to Sz = +1/2 and −1/2 in units of ~, and the projectors—we use [ψ] for |ψ〉〈ψ| if |ψ〉 is
normalized—[z+] and [z−]. These projectors commute; in fact [z+][z−] = [z−][z+] = 0, the zero operator,
which in quantum mechanics represents the proposition that is always false. On the other hand, Sx = +1/2
1This may simply reflect the fact that physicists are not smart enough. I tell my students that perhaps superintelligent
robots, when they make their appearance, may be able to solve the quantum mysteries using quantum logic. But if they do,
will they be able (or even want) to explain it to us?
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and −1/2 correspond to the projectors [x+] and [x−], projecting on the rays containing |x±〉 = (|z+〉 ±
|z−〉/√2, neither of which commutes with either [z+] or [z−]. The single framework rule says that it is
meaningless to simultaneously assign values to Sx and Sz, e.g., “Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = −1/2” makes no
sense. Note that the single framework rule does not at all forbid a quantum discussion or description using
either Sx or Sz, both of which could be individually meaningful or useful; what it says is that the combination
lacks physical meaning.
One way to see that the combination “Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = −1/2” cannot be defined is to note that
every ray in a (complex) two-dimensional Hilbert space can be interpreted to mean that the some component
of spin angular momentum, corresponding to some direction in space, has the value +1/2. There are no rays
left over, thus no room in the Hilbert space, for a property representing such a (supposed) conjunction.2
That it does not make sense is also implicit in the assertion found in textbooks that there is no way to
simultaneously measure Sx and Sz. This is correct, and we shall say more about measurements in Sec. 3.
However, students would be less confused were they given the fundamental reason behind this: it is impossible
to measure what is not there.
In histories quantum mechanics the single framework rule is a basic tool for resolving all manner of
quantum paradoxes, or at least taming them in the sense of changing them from unresolved conceptual
difficulties into interesting examples of how the quantum world differs from that of everyday experience.
The reader will find numerous examples in Chs. 19 to 25 of [13].
2.2 Probabilities
The standard (Kolmogorov) probability theory used in the histories approach requires three things: a
sample space S of mutually exclusive possibilities, an event algebra E , and a probability measure M that
assigns probabilities to the elements of E . Classical statistical mechanics employs the phase space Γ as the
sample space. However, a more useful analogy for discussing the quantum case is that of a coarse graining of
Γ formed by dividing it up into a finite number of nonoverlapping cells which together cover the entire space.
With cell j is associated an indicator function Pj(γ) equal to 1 if the point γ lies in cell j, and 0 otherwise.
Since the cells do not overlap, the product PjPk of two indicators is 0 if j 6= k. This corresponds to the fact
that the different cells which form the sample space represent mutually exclusive possibilities. In addition,∑
j Pj = I corresponds to the fact that at any given time the phase point γ representing the system must
be in one of the cells; thus one and only one of these mutually exclusive possibilities is true. The simplest
choice for the event algebra E is the collection of all subsets of Γ formed by unions of some of the cells which
make up the sample space, with the indicator function of the union equal to the sum of the indicators of the
cells of which it is composed. Including the empty set, whose indicator 0 is the function everywhere equal
to zero, results in a Boolean algebra in that the negation I − P of any P ∈ E and the conjunction PQ of
any two of its elements are also members of E .
By analogy, in the quantum case a sample space S is obtained by choosing a collection of projectors {Pj}
which sum to the identity I—which implies that the projectors are orthogonal to each other, PjPk = 0 = PkPj
for j 6= k— as a quantum sample space S. The set of all projectors formed by taking sums of some of the
projectors in {Pj}, plus the 0 operator, is the corresponding quantum event algebra E . The event algebra is
called a framework, a term also used for the projective decomposition that generates it. (As there is a one-
to-one correspondence between S and E , this double usage should not cause confusion.) The same physical
interpretation can be used as in the classical case: the {Pj} constitute a collection of mutually exclusive
properties, one and only one of which is true at a particular time. Thus in the sample space employed in
(1), the observable A will possess one and only one of its eigenvalues. The event algebra allows more general
things; e.g., “A has either the value a2 or a3” is represented by P2 + P3.
An important difference between the classical and the quantum case is that in the former if one uses
two different coarse grainings, two different collections of cells, each of which covers the entire phase space,
there is always a common refinement, a coarse graining using cells made up of intersections of cells from
the two collections. Its event algebra includes among its members all the members of the event algebras of
the two coarse grainings from which it is derived. Exactly the same is possible in the quantum case if and
only if each of the projectors in one decomposition commutes with every projector in the other; that is, if
the two decompositions are compatible. Otherwise there is no common refinement, and the single framework
2Quantum logic gets around this by assigning to (Sz = +1/2) ∧ (Sx = −1/2) the 0 projector, the property that is always
false. The difficulties this leads to are discussed in Sec. 4.6 of [13].
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rule prevents putting the frameworks together in a common probabilistic model. For example, with specific
reference to the observable A in (1), let Q be a projector that does not commute with one of the Pj . Then the
framework {Q, I − Q} is incompatible with {Pj}, and according to the single framework rule the question
“What is the value of A given that the quantum system has the property Q?” has no meaning. (The
situation is different if Q is understood as a pre-probability; e.g., the role played by [Ψ2] in (12) in Sec. 3.3.)
Since the single framework rule lacks any exact classical analog, it is easily misunderstood. The following
principles may help prevent such misunderstanding. First, the single framework rule allows the physicist
perfect Liberty to construct different, perhaps incompatible, frameworks when analyzing and describing a
quantum system. No law of nature singles out a particular quantum framework as the “correct” description of
a quantum system; there is, from a fundamental point of view, perfect Equality among different possibilities.
The key principle of Incompatibility prohibits combining incompatible frameworks into a single description,
or employing them for a single logical argument leading from premisses to conclusions. Finally comes
Utility: not every framework is useful for understanding a particular physical situation. It is also important
to avoid the mistake of thinking that the physicist’s choice of framework somehow influences reality. Instead,
quantum reality allows a variety of alternative descriptions, useful for different purposes, which when they
are incompatible cannot be combined. Different coarse grainings of a classical phase space, or different views
of a mountain from the north and from the south, are classical analogies which may help in understanding
Liberty, Equality, and Utility. But Incompatibility requires a quantum example, as provided by the Sx and
Sz descriptions of a spin-half particle discussed in Sec. 2.1 above.
The probability measure M in standard probability theory is a nonnegative function µ on the event
algebra E . It is additive over disjoint sets, and normalized, µ(I) = 1. For our purposes it suffices to assume
that a nonnegative number µj is attached to each indicator Pj in the sample space in such a way that∑
j µj = 1. From this the probability of elements of the event algebra is determined in the usual way,
e.g. Pr(P2 + P3) = µ2 + µ3. The same procedure works in the quantum case: to each projector Pj in the
decomposition of the identity (quantum sample space) under consideration one assigns a probability µj ≥ 0
satisfying
∑
j µj = 1 and then sums of these to the projectors making up the corresponding event algebra.
It is important to note that aside from positivity, additivity, and normalization, mathematical probability
theory imposes no restrictions on the µj . The same is true for quantum theory, except that under certain
conditions one can use the Born rule and its extensions in order to generate probabilities for a closed system,
as discussed below.
Probability theory can be understood as an extension of propositional logic, where probability 1 corre-
sponds to a proposition that is true, and probability 0 to one that is false. In order to maintain the same
connection in quantum theory, it follows that “true” and “false” must, like probabilities, be framework-
dependent concepts. This dependence has sometimes been thought to imply that the histories approach
leads to contradictions, propositions which are both true and false [18, 19, 20]. However, the single frame-
work rule prevents contradictions from arising [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], and one can show, see Ch. 16 of [13],
that the histories approach provides a consistent scheme for probabilistic inference.
2.3 Time development
In textbook quantum mechanics Schro¨dinger’s equation provides a deterministic unitary time develop-
ment of “the wave function” until an external measurement causes a mysterious wave function collapse.
This approach, found in [14], is widely (and properly) regarded as unsatisfactory. In the histories approach
quantum dynamics is always a stochastic process, whether or not a measurement occurs, and solutions to
Schro¨dinger’s equation are used to compute probabilities by means of the Born rule and its extensions. Here
we summarize the essentials needed for the discussion of measurements in Sec. 3.
Quantum stochastic time development can be described using a history Hilbert space H˘, which for a
sequence of events at times t0 < t1 < · · · tf is a tensor product
H˘ = H⊙H⊙ · · ·H, (2)
of f + 1 copies of the Hilbert space H used for the system at a single time, where the customary tensor
product symbol ⊗ has been replaced by ⊙ as a matter of convenience, to have a distinctive symbol separating
events at different times. An individual quantum history of the simplest sort is a tensor product of projectors
Y = F0 ⊙ F1 ⊙ · · ·Ff , (3)
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and thus itself a projector on the history Hilbert space. Its physical interpretation is “property F0 at time
t0, then property F1 at time t1, then . . . ”, where “then” could be replaced by “and.” In general, successive
events are not connected with each other in any way related to Schro¨dinger’s equation.
Rather than the most general case we restrict ourselves to the situation in which at time t0 the projector
F0 = [Ψ0] projects onto a specific initial state |Ψ0〉, and at each later time tm, Fm belongs to the event algebra
generated by a specific decomposition {Pαmm } of the identity,
∑
αm
Pαmm = I. Here the αm are labels, not
exponents, the subscript m indicates the time, and different decompositions may be used at different times.
The sample space of histories corresponds to a collection {Y α}, where α = (α1, . . . αf ) is a vector of labels,
and
Y α = [Ψ0]⊙ Pα11 ⊙ Pα22 ⊙ · · ·Pαff . (4)
If in addition one includes the special history (I − [Ψ0]) ⊙ I ⊙ I ⊙ · · · I, which is assigned a probability of
0 and hence plays no role in the following discussion, the history projectors in the sample space sum to the
history space identity I˘ = I ⊙ I ⊙ · · · I, and thus constitute a set of mutually exclusive possibilities, one and
only one of which can be said to occur. The collection of all projectors which are sums of some of the Y α
forms the event algebra.
For a closed system that does not interact with an external environment, solving Schro¨dinger’s equation
yields a unitary time development operator T (t, t′) for the time interval from t′ to t; it is equal to exp[−i(t−
t′)H/~] in the case of a time-independent Hamiltonian H . Using this time development operator we define
a chain ket
|α〉 = Pαff T (tf , tf−1)P
αf−1
f−1 T (tf−1, tf−2) · · ·Pα11 T (t1, t0)|Ψ0〉 (5)
for every history Y α in the sample space. A family of histories satisfies the consistency condition, and is
called a consistent family, provided the inner product of two chain kets for distinct elements of the history
sample space vanishes,
〈α|α′〉 = µαδ(α, α′), (6)
where δ(α, α′) is 1 if αm = α
′
m for every m, and is 0 otherwise. When (6) is satisfied the µα are the
(extended) Born probabilities for histories in the sample space, and determine the probabilities for histories
in the event algebra in the usual way. Condition (6) is needed to ensure that the probabilities defined in this
way satisfy the usual rules of probability theory; e.g., if one sums the joint distribution over all possibilities
at a particular time tj the result should be the joint distribution for the events at the remaining times as
calculated omitting all mention of tj from the family of histories. For a more detailed discussion of this point
see Sec. 10.2 of [13].
In the case f = 1, histories involving only two times t0 and t1, the consistency condition is automatically
satisfied, since the projectors at time t1 are orthogonal to each other, and the probabilities are exactly those
given by the usual Born rule. Note, however, that these probabilities refer to states of affairs inside a closed
quantum system, not to outcomes of measurements carried out on that system by some external apparatus.
The overall consistency of this approach is shown in Sec. 3 below, where measurements themselves are treated
as quantum mechanical processes occurring within a (large) closed system.
When f = 2 or more, a family of histories involving three or more times, the consistency condition (6) on
the orthogonality of chain kets for α 6= α′ is quite restrictive. Families of histories for which it is not satisfied
cannot be assigned probabilities in a consistent manner. It may be that even when the history projectors
of two different consistent families commute with each other, so that there is a common refinement, this
refinement does not satisfy the consistency conditions, and so cannot be assigned probabilities. It is then
natural to extend the single framework rule to include a prohibition of such combinations.3
There are various extensions of the type of analysis given above to more general situations. In place of
an initial pure state [Ψ0] at t0 one can use a more general projector or a density operator; in that case chain
operators are employed in place of chain kets. Sometimes the weaker requirement that the real part of 〈α|α′〉
vanish for α 6= α′, allowing the imaginary part to be nonzero, is used in place of (6), though there are reasons
[27] for preferring the stronger condition.4 Rather than assuming an initial state at t0 one can use a final
state at tf , or indeed some property at an intermediate time, as the “initial” condition. In constructing a
history family the choice of projectors at a particular time can be made dependent on which event occurred
at an earlier (or at a later) time. Numerous examples illustrating some of these points will be found in [13].
3 The three-box paradox discussed in Sec. 22.5 of [13] provides a simple example.
4Whereas this weaker requirement is mentioned in Ch. 10 of [13], all the examples in that book conform to the stronger
condition, i.e., (6).
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(Using the Heisenberg representation for projectors that enter chain kets or chain operators results in more
compact expressions that lead to the same consistency conditions and probabilities as in the more intuitive
Schro¨dinger picture employed here.)
3 Measurements
3.1 Two measurement problems
It is clear that any claim to know something about a microscopic quantum system must go beyond elemen-
tary human sense impressions and make use of data provided by suitable instruments that amplify quantum
effects and, so to speak, make them visible; in particular we need to understand physical measurements as
genuine quantum processes. But this is the infamous measurement problem of quantum foundations, which
has two parts. The first measurement problem is that of understanding the macroscopic outcome—we adopt
the picturesque though outdated language of the position of a visible pointer—in proper quantum mechanical
terms. The second measurement problem is to relate the pointer position to the prior microscopic property
the instrument was designed to measure. Here ’prior’ means earlier in time, since very often the measurement
either destroys or radically alters the system being measured: think of the detection of a gamma ray, or the
scattering process by which it is inferred that a neutrino came from the sun or from a supernova. We need a
quantum theory of retrodiction, inferring something about the past from present data. (Not to be confused
with retrocausation, the notion that the future can influence the past.) Obviously, analyzing measurements
as physical processes cannot employ measurement as some sort of primitive concept, as in textbooks. Hence
the need for a fully consistent description of microscopic quantum properties, one constructed without using
measurement as a primitive concept or axiom, as summarized in Sec. 2 above. We shall now show how these
principles can be used to resolve both measurement problems. The result will then be used in Sec. 4 to argue
that Hilbert-space quantum mechanics itself gives rise, in a rather natural way, to an epistemic restriction
which does not need to be added as an extra axiom.
3.2 Quasiclassical frameworks
Describing ordinary macroscopic objects in a consistent, fully quantum-mechanical fashion is a nontrivial
problem, and it would be premature to claim that every detail has been worked out. Nevertheless, the
work of Omne`s [28, 29], and Gell-Mann and Hartle [30, 31, 32] provides a general procedure which seems
adequate to the task. We will briefly describe the strategy used by Gell-Mann and Hartle (also see Ch. 26
of [13]). The first idea is that classical properties can be usefully described using a quasiclassical quantum
framework employing coarse-grained projectors that project onto Hilbert subspaces of enormous, albeit finite,
dimension, suitably chosen so as to be counterparts of classical properties such as those used in macroscopic
hydrodynamics. Next one argues that the stochastic quantum dynamics associated with a family of histories
constructed using these coarse-grained projectors gives rise, in suitable circumstances, to individual histories
which occur with high probability and are quantum counterparts of the trajectories in phase space predicted
by classical Hamiltonian mechanics. There are exceptions; for example, in a system whose classical dynamics
is chaotic with sensitive dependence upon initial conditions one does not expect the quantum histories to
be close to deterministic, but then in practice one also has to replace the deterministic classical description
with something probabilistic in order to obtain useful results.
A quasiclassical family can hardly be unique given the enormous size of the corresponding Hilbert sub-
spaces, but this is of no great concern provided classical mechanics is reproduced to a good approximation, in
the sense just discussed, by any of them. Therefore all discussions which involve nothing but classical physics
can, from the quantum perspective, be carried out using only a single quasiclassical framework. And as long
as reasoning and descriptions are restricted to this one framework there is no need for the single framework
rule, which explains why a central principle needed to understand quantum mechanics is completely absent
from classical physics.
Sometimes the objection has been raised [33, 34] that quasiclassical frameworks are not the unique
possibilities allowed by the histories approach to quantum mechanics. In particular, a consistent family can
be constructed in which the projectors are quasiclassical up to some time, and then followed by a completely
different type of projector at later times, and there is no reason from the perspective of fundamental quantum
mechanics to disallow this. However, there is also no reason to prefer it. The histories approach does not
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deny that other incompatible consistent families can be constructed; it simply insists that this possibility
does not invalidate a description employing a quasiclassical framework, which is what is needed for thinking
about pointer positions. See the discussion of Liberty, etc. in Sec. 2.2. By analogy, the possibility of using
Sx to describe a spin-half particle does not invalidate a description based on Sz; what cannot be done is to
combine them.
3.3 A measurement model
To see how the histories approach resolves both measurement problems we consider a simple model of
the measuring process that, apart from minor changes, goes back to Ch. VI of [14]. Let HS be the Hilbert
space of the system to be measured, henceforth referred to as a particle, and HM that of the measuring
device. For example, HS could be the 2-dimensional Hilbert space of the spin of a spin-half particle, while
the quantum description of its position might be among the variables included in HM . Let {|sj〉} be an
orthonormal basis for HS , with states labeled by a superscript so that the subscript position can refer to
time. At t0 let |M0〉 be the initial (normalized) state of the apparatus, while
|ψ0〉 =
∑
j
cj |sj〉, |Ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉 ⊗ |M0〉 (7)
are the initial states of the particle and of the total closed system that includes both particle and measuring
device. The cj are complex numbers satisfying
∑
j |cj |2 = 1, so both |ψ0〉 and |Ψ0〉 are normalized.
Let T (t, t′), as in Sec. 2.3, be the unitary time development operator for the total system, and assume
it is trivial, equal to the identity operator I = IS ⊗ IM , for t and t′ both less than some t1 or both greater
than t2, and that for the interval from t1 to t2,
T (t2, t1)
(|sj〉 ⊗ |M0〉
)
= |sˆj〉 ⊗ |M j〉. (8)
Here the {|M j〉} are orthonormal states of the apparatus, 〈M j |Mk〉 = δjk, corresponding to different pointer
positions, and the {|sˆj〉} on the right side of the equation—note they are not assumed to be the same as
the {|sj〉} on the left side—are normalized, 〈sˆj |sˆj〉 = 1, though (unlike von Neumann’s original model) not
necessarily orthogonal. The transformation (8) is unitary, or, to be more precise, it can be extended to
a unitary transformation on HS ⊗ HM , because the orthogonality of the |M j〉 ensures that the states on
the right side of (8) are mutually orthogonal, even though this may not be true of the {|sˆj〉}. Noting that
T (t2, t0) = T (t2, t1) · I and applying (8) to (7), one sees that unitary time development leads to states
|Ψ1〉 = T (t1, t0)|Ψ0〉 = |Ψ0〉,
|Ψ2〉 = T (t2, t0)|Ψ0〉 =
∑
j
cj |sˆj〉 ⊗ |M j〉 (9)
for the total system at times t1 and t2.
We now wish to consider various consistent families that begin with [Ψ0] = |Ψ0〉〈Ψ0| at time t0. One
possibility is unitary time development:
F0 : [Ψ0] ⊙ {[Ψ1], I − [Ψ1]} ⊙ {[Ψ2], I − [Ψ2]} (10)
for times t0 < t1 < t2, where the different histories in the sample space are made up by choosing one of
the projectors inside the curly brackets at each of the later times. Since the events I − [Ψ1] and I − [Ψ2]
occur with zero probability they could actually be omitted without causing confusion; only the history
[Ψ0]⊙ [Ψ1]⊙ [Ψ2] occurs, and it is assigned a probability of 1. While F0 is perfectly acceptable as a family
of quantum histories, it cannot be used to discuss possible outcomes of the measurement because it does not
include the projectors {[Mk]} for the pointer positions at time t2, and it cannot be refined to include them
because [Ψ2] does not commute with some of the [M
k], provided at least two of the cj in (7) are nonzero.
Thus the first measurement problem cannot be solved if one insists that all time development is unitary and
not stochastic.
The histories approach can solve the first measurement problem by using the family
F1 : [Ψ0] ⊙ [Ψ1] ⊙ {[Mk]}. (11)
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in place of F0. Here the alternative I− [Ψ1] at t1, which occurs with zero probability, has been omitted, and
we employ the usual physicist’s convention that [Mk] = |Mk〉〈Mk| means IS⊗ [Mk] on the full Hilbert space
HS ⊗ HM . An additional projector R′ = I −
∑
k[M
k] should be included at the final time in (11) so that
the total sum is the I, but again it is omitted since its probability is zero. Note that there is no reference to
the later particle states |sˆk〉 in (8); they are in fact irrelevant for discussing the macroscopic outcomes of the
measurement. While [Ψ2] cannot be one of the properties at time t2 in family F1, see the discussion of F0
above, it can very well be used as a mathematical device (a pre-probability in the terminology of Sec. 9.4 of
[13]) to calculate probabilities of the different pointer positions:
Pr([Mk]2) = Tr( [Ψ2] [M
k] ) = 〈Ψ2| [Mk] |Ψ2〉. (12)
Note that this is a perfectly legitimate and consistent “epistemic” use of |Ψ2〉, since it, like a probabil-
ity distribution, provides some information about the system, even when it does not represent a physical
property.
In order to relate the measurement outcome to a prior property of the measured particle and thus solve
the second measurement problem, one needs still another family :
F2 : [Ψ0] ⊙ {[sj ]} ⊙ {[Mk]}. (13)
Here the decomposition of the identity {[sj ]} at t1 refers to properties of the particle ([sj ] means [sj] ⊗ IM
on the full Hilbert space) without reference to the apparatus. It is straightforward to show that the family
F2 is consistent, and leads to a joint probability distribution, where the subscripts on [sj ] and [Mk] refer to
the time,
Pr( [sj ]1, [M
k]2) = |cj |2δjk, (14)
with marginals given by
Pr([sj ]1) = Pr([M
j ]2) = |cj |2. (15)
If |ck|2 > 0 the conditional probability for the earlier property [sj ]1 given the later pointer position [Mk]2 is
Pr([sj ]1 | [M
k]2) = δjk. (16)
That is to say, from the (macroscopic) measurement outcome or pointer position k at time t2, standard
statistical inference allows one to infer, to retrodict, that the particle had the property [sk] at the earlier
time t1. Also note that, (15), the probabilities for particle properties just before the measurement are
identical to those of the later pointer positions. This is what one would expect for ideal measurements. It
shows that textbooks (which follow the lead of [14]) in which students are taught to calculate |cj |2 for the
particle alone and then ascribe the resulting probability to the outcome of a measurement, are not wrong,
just confusing. It is worth remarking once again that the later particle states, the |sˆj〉 in (8), play no role
in the discussion. In von Neumann’s model these were set equal to the |sj〉, and while this is of course
a perfectly legitimate choice, it has given rise to considerable confusion in that “measurements” are often
interpreted as involving a correlation between the pointer position and the later particle state, something
that should properly be called a preparation, not a measurement.
The measurement model discussed above is in some ways rather artificial. However, once one understands
its basic features it is possible to construct more realistic models in which the particle states to be measured
form a general (projective) decomposition of IS not limited to pure states, the pointer positions are repre-
sented not by pure states but by quasiclassical projectors onto appropriate Hilbert spaces, the initial state of
the apparatus is a quasiclassical projector or a density operator, and allowance is made for thermodynamic
irreversibility in the measurement process. See the relevant sections of Ch. 17 in [13] for details. None of
these extensions alters the basic conclusions reached on the basis of the simple model used above.
4 Information
Given a system with a d-dimensional Hilbert space, a projective decomposition of the identity can contain
at most d projectors, one for every element of some orthonormal basis. And since a probabilistic quantum
description must use only a single framework, the maximum amount of Shannon information that can be
associated with a sample space of a d-dimensional quantum system, the Shannon entropy H if a probability
9
1/d is assigned to each possibility, is log d. Thus a qudit of dimension d (using the terminology of quantum
information theory) cannot receive or contain or carry more than log2 d bits of information. This is a
fundamental epistemic restriction arising directly from the Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics.
This restriction is confirmed by, or is at least consistent with, various results in quantum information
theory. A common scenario is one in which Alice prepares a qudit of dimension d in a known quantum state,
chosen from a specified set of possibilities according to some probability distribution, and sends it to Bob, who
is allowed to carry out a generalized measurement (POVM), or perhaps a collective measurement on several
qudits at the same time, with the aim of determining which states Alice prepared. We assume the protocol
is repeated N times, and each time Alice records what she prepares. Similarly, Bob records his measurement
outcomes. As both of their records belong to the quasiclassical world they can be analyzed using classical
(Shannon) information theory, and a well-known bound due to Holevo (see, e.g., Sec. 12.1.1 of [35]) shows that
the Shannon mutual information H(A : B) cannot exceed N log2 d. This upper bound is actually achieved if
Alice randomly (with equal probability) prepares states corresponding to some orthonormal basis, and Bob
measures in the same basis. Thus the limitation implied by the analysis of properties and measurements
in Sec. 3.3 can, with the help of some not altogether trivial mathematics, be shown to be quite general.
Neither sophisticated encoding schemes nor the most general of generalized measurements can do any better
than what is implied by the analysis in Secs. 2 and 3: at most dN distinct messages, corresponding to
log2 d
N = N log2 d bits, can be constructed using N letters chosen from an alphabet of size d.
The reader could be concerned that this epistemic limit might be violated by schemes for dense coding,
or is somehow inconsistent with teleportation, or maybe does not apply to quantum, in contrast to classical,
information. Let us briefly discuss each of these, starting with the last. Both “quantum” and “classical”
information remain ill-defined terms in the quantum information literature, despite (or perhaps because of?)
an enormous number of publications. However, one can understand the basic issue by means of a simple
example, a d = 2 perfect quantum channel, constructed from a magnetic-field-free pipe into which Alice
sends a spin-half particle, which is measured by Bob when it emerges at the other end. If Alice prepares the
state Sw = +1/2, where w is some specific direction in space: z or −z or x or whatever, and Bob measures
in the Sw basis, the result will always (probability 1) be Sw = +1/2 and not Sw = −1/2. The basis must
be specified, as there is no way to prepare (or measure) a particle with, say, Sz = +1/2 AND Sx = 1/2.
Consequently this quantum channel with capacity 1 (qu)bit cannot actually transmit information at a rate
greater than a perfect classical channel that can only transmit quasiclassical states corresponding to a bit
which is either 0 or 1, and always yields the same output as the input. More generally, the quantum capacity
cannot exceed the classical capacity (see Secs. 12.3 and 12.4 of [35] for technical discussions), and talking
about quantum information (whatever it might be!) does not alter the log2 d upper limit for one qudit.
One can be misled by the very useful but somewhat dangerous visualization of a spin-half particle as a
little top spinning about a particular axis. The direction w which Alice uses to produce the state Sw = +1/2
might be specified very precisely by some macroscopic setting on her apparatus, so it is tempting to suppose
that information about this precise setting, which might amount to many bits (depending on the precision),
is then carried away by the particle. But, as noted in Sec. 2.1, there is no room in the quantum Hilbert space
for this kind of information, the distinction one might want to make between w and a direction w′ which is
nearby, or even between w and a w′ which is perpendicular to it (e.g, x instead of z).5 A less misleading,
albeit still classical, visualization is to think of the Sw = +1/2 state as a spinning top whose axis is oriented
at random, but with the constraint that the w component of its angular momentum be positive.
Dense coding is a process by which d2 messages can be transmitted from Alice to Bob by sending a single
d-dimensional qudit through a quantum channel, provided a fully entangled state of two qudits, one in Alice’s
laboratory and the other in Bob’s, is initially available. This might seem to violate the epistemic limit, since
log2 d
2 = 2 log2 d is clearly larger than log2 d. The solution to this apparent paradox is a proper microscopic
analysis of where information is located at the intermediate time between Alice’s preparation and Bob’s
measurement [36], a type of analysis which is not easy to do using the tools provided in typical textbooks
(including those devoted to quantum information), because they provide no systematic way of thinking about
microscopic quantum properties during the time interval between the (quasi)classical preparation and the
(quasi)classical measurement. To discuss the quantum state of the two qudits, which are initially in a fully-
entangled state, one has to use the tensor product of their Hilbert spaces, of dimension d2. There is then a
5The claim sometimes made that the precise information about w is “really” present in the particle but cannot be measured
reminds one of the student who, having just failed the examination, tells the professor he understood the subject perfectly, but
simply could not recall it during the test.
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projective decomposition of its identity corresponding to an orthonormal basis containing d2 fully-entangled
states, which are used to encode the d2 messages. Thus there is no violation of the epistemic limit, for two
particles are involved. We refer the reader to [36] for a similar discussion of teleportation; once again, all
information can be properly accounted for, and the fact that two uses of a d-dimensional classical channel
are required to complete the protocol, does not imply that a qudit or the corresponding quantum channel
has an information capacity of 2 log2 d. (Also see the discussion in [37] for further insight into the need for
a double usage of a classical channel.)
In addition, quantum information theory contains various epistemic restrictions on the information that
can be obtained from a quantum system or transmitted from one place to another in the form of inequalities,
sometimes referred to as epistemic uncertainty relations. Because some of them are obtained using sophis-
ticated mathematics, and tend to be expressed in terms of (quasiclassical) preparations and measurements,
it is not always made clear that these, too, arise from the fundamental Hilbert space structure of quantum
theory. So far as is known at present, information inequalities derived in this way, such as in [38], are entirely
consistent with experiment, in contrast to Bell inequalities and the like, which do not agree with experiment,
and whose derivation is based in a fundamental way upon classical physics (see, e.g., [1]).
5 Conclusion
If one assumes following von Neumann, and consistent with textbook quantum theory where it is not
always clearly discussed, that properties of a quantum system correspond to subspaces of its Hilbert space,
then there is a very natural epistemic restriction on what an external observer can know about a microscopic
quantum system. The Hilbert space does not contain, has no room for, combinations of incompatible
properties, such as Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = −1/2 for a spin half particle, and as a consequence these must be
excluded from a consistent quantum ontology, as discussed in detail in [12]. And of course what does not
exist cannot be known; such an ontological restriction leads automatically to an epistemic restriction.
Quantum textbooks already contain a version of this epistemic restriction. Students are told that in-
compatible quantum properties cannot be simultaneously measured. However, because textbooks treat
measurements as a sort of axiom which is incapable of further analysis, a black box which cannot be pried
open to see what is going on inside, the nature of this restriction remains clouded in a dense conceptual
fog. One needs a consistent quantum analysis of measurements, one capable of resolving both the first and
the second quantum measurement problems, to relate this restriction on measurements to mathematical
properties of the Hilbert space used in quantum mechanics to represent physical properties. And, as noted
in Sec. 4, some of the rigorous inequalities developed by quantum information theorists using the quantum
Hilbert space are also epistemic restrictions.
In addition to resolving the measurement problems, the histories approach provides a foundation for
understanding all the other strange, i.e., nonclassical, quantum phenomena, including those which cannot at
present be obtained from a classical model by adding an epistemic restriction (see the discussion in Sec. V of
[5]). This is because it has a consistent formulation of the fundamental principles of Hilbert space quantum
mechanics, the principles that underlie the generally accepted calculational techniques taught in textbooks.
It may be that applying still more restrictions, or perhaps additions, to classical models will eventually yield
the correct quantum outcomes. But one can ask whether such a circuitous route, somewhat analogous to
tweaking Bohr’s semiclassical quantization condition, would be worthwhile, given the availability of a more
direct path to understanding the phenomena in question.
This is not to say that the study of classical models of the sort considered in [4, 5] is without value.
It is surely of interest to understand the limits of classical physics when it is pushed as far as possible
into the quantum domain. Not least because in the domain where classical physics functions very well, the
quasiclassical regime of macroscopic phenomena, it provides a much simpler and easier calculational scheme
than any full-scale quantum counterpart. Who would ever want to compute an earth satellite orbit starting
with a wave function? However, such studies of classical models will, we believe, be most effective when
combined with a consistent and complete microscopic quantum theory, one that takes full account of the
noncommutation of quantum projectors, is not dependent upon a vague concept of “measurement,” and does
not require any additional epistemic restrictions beyond those implied by the formalism itself. It is hoped
that the work presented here will contribute to that end.
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